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Abstract 
There are both high resource and political costs in defining and enforcing property rights to 
water and in managing it with markets. In this paper, I examine these issues in the semi-arid U.S. 
West where many of the intensifying demand and supply problems regarding fresh water are 
playing out. I begin by illustrating the current state of water markets in 12 western U.S. states. 
There are major differences in water prices across uses (agriculture, urban, environmental) and 
these differences appear to persist, suggesting that water markets have not developed fully 
enough to narrow the gaps.  Moreover, there is considerable difference in the extent and nature 
of water trading across the western states, suggesting that water values and transaction costs of 
trade vary considerably across jurisdictions. I then turn to the resource and political costs of 
defining water rights and expanding the use of markets.  In this discussion, efficiency and equity 
objectives play important, often conflicting, roles.  This tension reflects the very social nature of 
the water resource. To understand the problems of expanding water markets, it is critical to 
understand the varying political, bureaucratic, and administrative incentives involved.  
 
Introduction 
There is growing concern about the availability of fresh water worldwide, as demand 
grows and as supplies become more uncertain due to the potential effects of climate change.  
With rising per capita incomes and growing populations, human consumption of water is rising, 
just as demands for water for agriculture, recreation, and environmental habitats are increasing.
1
  
At the same time, climate change is predicted to make precipitation more variable with the 
possibility of longer drought periods (Barnett et al., 2008; World Water Assessment Program, 
2009).   As water values rise due to increased demand and limited supply, one might expect that 
formal property rights to water would be made more precise and that water markets would 
become active to more effectively address allocation, management, and conservation pressures.  
                                                          
1
 The Economist (April 8, 2009, 52) speculates that no more than 20 per cent of the available 
water can be „safely‟ withdrawn by humans on an on-going basis without having a negative 
impact on the natural environment 
(http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13447271). 
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A process of property rights development and market activity as asset values exogenously 
rise was described by Harold Demsetz in his classic 1967 paper.  Indeed, institutional 
arrangements for many resources, such as hard rock minerals and oil and gas reservoirs in the 
U.S., developed in a manner consistent with the Demsetz hypothesis (Libecap, 1978, 2007; 
Libecap and Smith, 2002). Further in a broader context, commodity markets adjust rapidly to 
price differentials and reallocate the assets so that price gaps narrow over time.  As we will see, 
however, this process of property rights formation and price convergence is not happening as 
quickly for fresh water in the western U.S. (Young, 1986, Brewer, et al, 2008).  
There are both high resource and political costs in defining and enforcing property rights 
to water and in managing it with markets. In this paper, I examine these issues in the semi-arid 
U.S. West where many of the intensifying demand and supply problems regarding fresh water 
are playing out. To understand the problems of expanding water markets, it is critical to 
understand the varying political, bureaucratic, and administrative incentives involved.  
I begin by illustrating the current state of water markets in 12 western U.S. states.
2
 We 
will see that there are major differences in water prices across uses (agriculture, urban, 
environmental) and that these differences appear to persist beyond what can be explained by 
differences in conveyance costs and water quality, suggesting that water markets have not 
developed fully enough to narrow the gaps.  Moreover, there is considerable difference in the 
extent and nature of water trading across the western states, suggesting that water values and 
transaction costs of trade vary considerably. I then turn to the resource and political costs of 
defining water rights and the use of markets.  In this discussion, efficiency and equity issues play 
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 The states include California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, 
Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, and Texas.  
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important, often conflicting, roles.  This tension reflects the very social nature of the water 
resource.  
Efficiency: The Extent of Water Trading 
Water Price Differentials 
 Contemporary western water markets generally are local with trading confined within 
water basins and sectors (among adjacent irrigators, for example). Typically, exchange outside of 
a water basin is limited, and voluntary private transactions to move water from agriculture to 
urban use often is very costly, and in some cases, extremely contentious. And there is virtually 
no private water trading across state boundaries.  
 Price differences across uses illustrate the opportunity for exchange, but they are difficult 
to assemble because of segmented markets, limited comparable observations of trades within and 
across sectors, high shipping or conveyance costs, diverse regulatory regimes, and variation in 
water quality. Accordingly, examining available price data must be done with caution, but the 
patterns are indicative of the thinness of many water markets and of the efficiency gains from 
further re-allocation.
3
   
 Data assembled by Clay Landry and reported in Libecap (2011) for two regional markets, 
the Reno/Truckee Basin, Nevada and the South Platte Basin, Colorado, indicate significant price 
gaps between agriculture-to-urban and agricultural-to-agriculture transactions. For the Truckee 
Basin, the median price of 1,025 agriculture-to-urban water sales between 2002 and 2009 (2008 
prices) was $17,685/acre foot (an acre foot = 325,851 gallons, about enough to meet the needs of 
4 people for a year), whereas for 13 agriculture-to-agriculture sales over the same period the 
median price was $1,500/AF. For the South Platte, the median price for 138 agriculture-to-urban 
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 For additional discussion of western water markets, see Libecap (2011). 
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sales between 2002 and 2008 was $6,519/AF as compared to $5,309/AF for 110 agriculture-to-
agriculture transactions. 
Aggregating transactions across markets and time can compensate for limited comparable 
transactions within local markets in order to gain a sense of differences in value across sectors, 
recognizing the qualifiers noted above.  The data reported here are from a data base of 4,220 
observations from 1987 through 2008 as compiled by the author.
4
 The dataset is not conclusive 
because transactions are likely to be missed, especially those that take place within 
organizations, such as irrigation districts.  
Of the 4,220 transactions in the dataset with information on the transacting parties, 
amounts, and nature of use, a smaller number, 2,765, have price data.  Table 1 shows mean and 
median prices per acre foot (an acre foot is 326,000 gallons of water) for leases and sales for 
agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban trades.
 5
  The prices for sales are given as the 
value per acre-foot of committed flow of water, which is analogous to a one-year lease price.
6
 By 
discounting quantity flows, using the same methodology as for determining the present value of 
                                                          
4
 The dataset currently includes 4407 transactions through 2009.  Because 2009 transactions will 
continue to be indicated throughout 2010, the 2009 transactions currently in the database were 
excluded from the analysis. The full dataset and the methodology are described at 
http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm. See also Brewer, et al. (2008) for 
discussion of methodology.  
 
5
 We converted all prices into dollars per acre-foot of water for comparison across time. Prices 
for one-year transactions were easily presented in per acre-foot terms.  For example, if 1,000 
acre-feet of water was leased for one year for a total price of $100,000, then the per-acre-foot 
price was $100. 
 
6 Consider a sale of 1,000 acre-feet of water for a total price of $2 million. The per-acre foot 
price is $2,000. This is the traditional method of showing sale prices. However, it is not directly 
comparable to the one-year lease price because the sale commits a flow of water to the buyer in 
perpetuity.  In the example of a sale of 1,000 acre-feet of water for a total price of $2 million, 
using 5 percent to discount the quantity flows, leads to discounted sales price of $100 per acre-
foot.   
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a perpetual bond, we calculate a single committed quantity.  With this discounted quantity we 
convert the total sales price into a per acre-foot price that is directly comparable to a per-acre-
foot, one-year lease price. Multi-year lease prices are treated similarly, using the same method as 
finding the present value of a multi-year bond and are combined with 1-year leases in Table 1.  
Based on historical use patterns, as much as 90% of western water is consumed in agriculture, 
but most new demand is for urban and environmental uses.
 7
  Accordingly, the trades reported 
are for movements of water within and out of agriculture.  
<<Insert Table 1 here>> 
As shown, the annual mean and median sale and lease prices for agriculture-to-urban 
transactions are significantly higher than are agriculture-to-agriculture trades (See statistical 
discussion below).  This condition in part indicates the benefits of out-of-sector water transfers. 
Other factors, such as more senior rights that may be associated with agriculture-to-urban 
transfers and higher wheeling or conveyance costs, also explain the higher prices. Further, 
because sales involve the transfer of water rights and a perpetual claim on water flows as 
compared to leases, which involve a shorter-term (often one-year) transfer of the right to use 
water, sale prices will be higher than lease prices.  
Figure 1 shows the patterns for agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban median 
prices over time for sales and one-year leases. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test
8
 was performed and 
the yearly median price of agriculture-to-urban transfers is greater than that of agriculture-to-
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 http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/wateruse/ 
 
8
 The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is similar to the standard difference-in-means t-test.  However, 
its non-parametric nature allows additional flexibility as it does not require a-priori assumptions 
on the distribution of its components.  The statistical significance holds for the difference in 
means as well. 
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agriculture transfers at a 1 percent significance level.
9
 In the dataset, agriculture-to-urban sales 
are dominated by transactions in Colorado on the Big-Thompson Project.
10
  Although there are 
limited data on agriculture-to-agriculture sales outside Colorado, the median agriculture-to-urban 
sale price in the 11 western states excluding Colorado is much greater, $708/AF, than the median 
price of agriculture-to-agriculture sales, $251/AF.   
<<Insert Figure 1 here>> 
There are two primary reasons why there are fewer observations for agriculture-to-
agriculture sales outside Colorado.
11
  One is that agriculture-to-agriculture sales can take place 
within irrigation districts, and these transactions are likely to be missed in the dataset used here.  
The entire 22-year dataset only reports 613 agriculture-to-agriculture trades for the 12 western 
states.  Brozovic et. al. (2002) report that in the Westlands Water District alone, where active 
intra-district trading takes place, 1,267 transactions occurred from 1993-1996.
12
  The second 
reason is that irrigators in western states often rely on leases instead of sales.  I examine this issue in 
more detail below, but basically leases are common because they involve low transaction costs with 
trades among neighboring irrigators. They typically do not require regulatory review.  A Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test was performed on 1-year lease prices for the 12 western states, of which Colorado 
represents a very small portion of transactions.  The test shows that the yearly median price of 
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 W=-183, p-value=0.0015. 
 
10
 The Colorado Big Thompson institutional details are discussed later in the text.  
 
11
 Of the 2765 priced transactions used in this analysis, 215 were Agriculture-to-Agriculture 
sales, 32 of which were outside of Colorado.  In contrast, there were 1140 Agriculture-to-Urban 
sales with price data, with 211 taking place outside Colorado. 
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 http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/updates/pdfn/V121_A2.pdf 
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Agriculture-to-urban transfers is greater than that of agriculture-to-agriculture transfers at a 1 percent 
significance level.
13 
Welfare Gains from Greater Market Trading 
 The differences in the prices of traded water in the two categories indicates that at the 
margin there can be significant efficiency gains from re-allocating some water from agriculture 
to urban and environmental uses.  Here we attempt to model what some of these gains might 
look like.  There are several obstacles to modeling the efficiency advantages of water trades, but 
they fall into three broad categories.  One, the physical aspects of water trades.  Water price 
depends not only on supply and demand generally, but also on local conditions such as 
conveyance ability and water quality.
 14
 Two, the transaction costs associated with differing 
regulations and incomplete property rights regimes across jurisdictions. Regulations vary by state 
and within states there can be county restrictions on transfers. Three, because water markets are 
local due to conveyance costs and regulatory restrictions, they are thin so that there are limited 
observations for transfers and prices, and these data can be affected by observations that are not 
indicative of general patterns.    
 To see this, Figure 1 shows agriculture-to-agriculture sales prices approximating 
agriculture-to-urban prices from 2006-2008.  The high-priced agriculture-to-agriculture sales in 
                                                          
13
 W=-158, p-value=0.003. 
 
14
 Conveyance costs can be high. Water is heavy. An acre foot of water weighs 2,719,226 pounds 
(325,851 gal/AF x 8.435 pounds/gal) or 1,360 tons. Conveyance costs can be high. Hansen, 
Howitt and Williams (2007, 3) report that 55 percent of the $250 that the Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California paid in 2002 for water from Northern California was for the cost 
of conveying it. 
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these years, however, took place within the Colorado Big-Thompson project, where 
administrative rules allow agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban transfers to occur 
freely, forcing agricultural users to pay the full opportunity cost of the water, which is the cost 
urban users are willing to pay.  For example, the January 2007 issue of Water Strategist reported 
a number of trades from the Colorado Big-Thompson project, among them a transfer from an 
irrigator to a developer for $9,673 and from an irrigator to another irrigator for $9,626.   
 Given the observed differences in water values between agriculture and urban 
applications, it is interesting to estimate what the welfare gain might be under varying scenarios 
of a hypothetical increase in water trading from the agriculture to urban sector. We consider two 
cases: 1). if just a small amount (1%) of current irrigation water or 10 % of the current urban 
market, which ever were smaller, or 2). if 3% of irrigation water or 100 % of the current urban 
market, which ever were smaller, were transferred to urban use. These constraints are designed 
to minimize any impact on agricultural or urban sector water prices and to reflect what might be 
feasible for an urban market to absorb.
15
 Kenny, et al (2009) provide estimates of the total and 
irrigated use of water in the U.S. by state and the Bren dataset 
http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm allows for trading estimates.  
 The state data are reported in Table 2, which provides estimates of total surface water 
used and in irrigation as of 2005, as well as the average committed volume of water transferred 
per year through all trades--sales, multi-year leases, and one-year leases, and that figure as a 
                                                          
15
 We assume that the additional transfers take place at the prevailing agriculture to urban market 
price. The net gain is this value, less the opportunity cost of water in agriculture as approximated 
by the agriculture-to-agriculture price.   
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share of total use and irrigation use.
16
 The final column lists the median price difference between 
agriculture-to-urban and agriculture-to-agriculture transfers.  
<<Insert Table 2 here>> 
 Table 3 outlines the hypothetical transfers.  Note that the volume of water in the proposed 
additional transfers is small compared to the water used for irrigation or to total current transfers. 
Column two shows the value of current water transfers; column three the proposed increase 
under option (1); the associated welfare gain and its share of current transfers are in columns four 
and five; the increase under (2) in column six and the associated gains in columns seven and 
eight.  
 The net welfare gain from moving a very small amount of water to urban users under (1) 
is estimated at $12 million per year and under (2) at $98 million per year. These figures represent 
gains of 3% and 24% of the value of the yearly water market activity of almost $406 million. 
Even under the conservative conditions imposed in this exercise, there are significant annual 
welfare gains from increased movement of water from agriculture to urban uses.  Any increases 
in trading are constrained by the existing (already small) size of the urban market. The estimates 
are illustrative only and some of the very large gains, such as in Colorado, Montana, Nevada, and 
Washington may be partially due to limited observations for agriculture-to-agriculture trades in 
the dataset. Nevertheless, they indicate the potential benefits of a more active water market. We 
now turn to a discussion of the nature of the current water market. 
<<Insert Table 3 here>> 
Water Transfers in 12 Western States 1987-2008 
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 As with discussed for Table 1, we convert all contracted amounts of water to a similar 
committed flow.  
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 All western states allow for transfers of water.  There are three types of transfers—
permanent sales of water rights, short-term leases (1 year), and longer-term leases (up to 35 years 
or more). Among these, there are transfers among those who use the water for the same   
purpose—irrigated agriculture for example, or among those with different purposes—
agriculture-to-urban or environmental, and transfers within a water basin (where sources are 
interrelated geologically) or across basins—out of one water region to another. Short-term leases 
within a basin among those who use water for the same purpose, such as farmers, typically have 
been the most common. Longer-term leases and sales of water rights often involve changes in the 
location and nature of use of water. 
Figure 2 illustrates the yearly path of all transfers in the 12 western states from 1987 
through 2008 as well as those for agriculture-to-agriculture, agriculture-to-urban, and 
agriculture-to-environmental trades. The figure shows that: (1) the total number of water 
transfers is increasing (statistically significant); (2) agriculture-to-urban and agriculture-to-
environmental trades are also rising (statistically significant); and (3) agriculture-to-agriculture 
trades show no discernable trend (statistically insignificant).
17
 
<<Insert Figure 2 here>> 
 
 Table 3 shows the nature of trades across states and by contract form from 1987 through 
2008.  Colorado dominates in terms of total market transactions, reflecting the institutional 
advantages of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, which are described below and where most 
of the transactions are sales. Other active market states are California, Texas, Arizona, and 
                                                          
17 Given that Colorado dominates the number of transactions, we note that the trends remain the 
same in terms of direction and statistical significance when Colorado transactions are removed. 
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Nevada. Within California and Texas short-term leases are the most prevalent contract, but 
multi-year leases and sales are also important. California‟s water institutional and regulatory 
environments explain the focus on short-term leases.  In Arizona and Nevada, rapidly urbanizing, 
dry states, sales are common, but, not surprisingly, Montana and Wyoming, the least urban of the 
12 western states, have the fewest water sales.  
<<Insert Table 3 here>> 
 Table 4 breaks down the trading activity by state into the share that is within the 
agriculture or urban sectors and that which is from agriculture to urban.  The differences between 
the annual flow and committed measures reflect the importance of sales and long-term leases in 
the latter.  Again, there are important differences across the states.  Among the leading water 
trading states, Arizona and California have relatively balanced transactions in recorded 
transactions, but Colorado, Texas, Nevada, and Washington show considerable activity to and 
within the urban sector.  
<<Insert Table 4 here>> 
 As indicated above there is water market activity across the western states, and there are 
opportunities for more activity to address growing problems of scarcity and reallocation. The 
question is what measurement and equity issues will be encountered? To address these issues, we 
first turn to water rights.  
Institutions: Western Water Rights 
Appropriative Surface Water Rights 
 In western states, individuals do not own water as they might own land. This in itself is 
suggestive of the special nature of water.  The state owns the water, which it holds in trust for its 
citizens. Individuals hold usufruct rights to the water, subject to the requirement that the use be 
12 
 
beneficial and reasonable and to oversight by the state in monitoring use and water transfers to 
insure that they are consistent with the public interest (Gould, 1995, 94; Simms 1995, 321).  
Accordingly, there is a broad regulatory framework for water so that western water rights 
potentially have less protection and are more fragile than most other property rights (Sax 1990, 
260; Gray 1994b, 262).  
 In most western states--Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah 
and Wyoming--all surface water rights are based on the prior appropriation doctrine that allows 
rights holders to withdraw a certain amount of water from a natural water course for beneficial 
purposes on land remote from the point of diversion (Getches, 1997, 74-189).  The appropriative 
doctrine emerged in the 19th century in response to the development of mining and agriculture in 
the semi-arid West where growing numbers of people and economic activities were increasingly 
concentrated in areas where there was too little water (Kanazawa, 1998). Prior appropriation 
allowed water to be separated from riparian land and moved via canals and ditches to new 
locations (Johnson et al. 1981). 
Appropriative rights are assigned through the rule of first possession or priority of claim. 
They grant rights to redirect a defined quantity of water from the source, based on the time of the 
initial diversion. Those with the earliest water claims have the highest priority and those with 
subsequent claims have lower-priority or junior claims. As such, there is a ladder of rights on a 
stream, ranging from highest in priority to the lowest. This allocative mechanism ranks 
competing claimants based on priority in order to ration water during times of drought.  
 Appropriative rights are to a fixed quantity of water to be diverted from the water source 
(surface or ground water), but transfers of water that change the point of diversion, timing, or 
13 
 
nature of use generally are based on the amount of water consumed (MacDonnell, 1990, Vol. I, p. 
11).
 18
  
 Under prior appropriation there is a critical interdependence among diverters from the 
same water source with different priority rights. Because as much as 50 percent of the original 
diversion may flow back to the stream or percolate down to the aquifer, it is available for 
subsequent users (Young, 1986, 1144). During times of drought when only senior appropriators 
may have their allotments fulfilled, junior appropriators are especially dependent upon these 
return flows. They bear most of the downside risk of drought. Actions by senior rights holders 
that affect water consumption and can influence the amount of water released downstream. 
Accordingly, water trading from agriculture to urban uses that involves export out of the basin 
can impair third parties and is subject to state regulation to insure that no harm is inflicted on 
junior diverters (Getches, 1997, 161). This is an issue to which we will return. 
Riparian Surface Water Rights 
 In the eastern states, water rights are based on ownership of land appurtenant to water 
flows.   Riparian land owners have rights to access the water adjacent to or passing through their 
properties for reasonable use, including fishing and navigation, and can utilize the water so long 
as doing so does not harm other riparian claimants downstream (Getches 1997, 33).  In cases of 
drought, all parties share in the reduced water flow. Riparian water rights are tied to the land can 
only be transferred with adjacent properties.  
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 Anderson and Johnson (1986) and Johnson, et al (1981). Johnson, et al describe how 
specifying a property right in water in terms of consumptive use with options for third-party 
grievances can be an effective method for promoting transfers.  Howitt and Hansen (2005, 60) 
point to both transaction costs through property rights and regulatory differences and often high 
costs of transporting water. See also Smith (2008) for discussion of water rights in a semi-
commons setting.   
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 Of the 12 western states examined here, the wettest states, California, Texas, Oregon, and 
Washington have a hybrid of prior appropriation and riparian systems, whereas the drier 8 states 
have prior appropriation only (Getches 1997, 8). When the two systems operate, there can be 
questions of priority of claim when diversion under the appropriative system seriously reduces 
the water available to riparian owners. Alternatively, riparian claims could prohibit diversion 
from streams as part of appropriative water claims. In western states, riparian claims have been 
limited, although in California they are given precedence in disputes with appropriative 
claimants under certain circumstances (Getches 1997, 87-93, 192-97). 
Groundwater Rights 
 Groundwater rights vary across the western states and most are not as well defined as are 
surface water rights (Thompson 1993, 684).  Most groundwater rights allow surface land owners 
access to a reasonable use of groundwater (Getches 1997, 251). With multiple, fragmented 
surface properties and the vague standard of reasonable use groundwater basins can be subject to 
competitive withdrawal and classic common-pool conditions.
19
  
 These are the basic water rights in the western U.S. Their definition and enforcement are 
affected by the physical characteristics of water, regulatory standards, and the many parties that 
have a say in the exchange of any water right.  
 
Efficiency and Equity: The Physical Characteristics of Water: Property Rights, Equity and 
Public Interest Demands.  
 
 Because of its fluid nature and that fact that many parties use water sequentially or 
simultaneously, there are significant resource and political costs in defining private water rights.  
                                                          
19 Provencher and Burt (1993), Glennon (2002, 209-24). For similarities with oil pools, see 
Libecap (1989, 93-114). 
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To see the effects of its physical characteristics, it is useful to compare water with land, which is 
fixed and observable, and with mobile, wild-ocean fish stocks, which are mobile like water, with 
regard to characteristics that affect the costs of defining and enforcing property rights.
20
 Table 5 
lists the three resources and the characteristics--ability to bound, partition, and exclude; measure 
size and amount; variability of supply; existence of simultaneous and sequential uses. The signs 
reported in each cell indicate how the characteristic impacts the costs of definition of property 
rights for the resource, with a plus sign indicating that it contributes to definition and a negative 
sign indicating that it hinders definition.  As can be seen, water is more similar to migratory fish 
stocks than to land in terms of the costs of bounding, exclusion, and measurement.  
<<Insert Table 5 here>> 
 
The Costs of Bounding 
 Because it is a liquid, surface and groundwater cannot be bounded or partitioned easily 
across claimants and uses (Smith, 2008).  This characteristic is also generally true for fisheries, 
where numerous competing fishers can exploit the same mobile stock as an open-access 
resource.
21
 Ownership to both resources is granted only upon extraction (diversion for water, 
harvest for fish) under the rule of capture. Stationary land is fixed and observable so that 
bounding costs are much lower. It is possible to fence and partition land to meet concurrent and 
sequential demands for farming, urban development, pastoral scenery or other amenities, such as 
provision of wildlife habitat.  
                                                          
20 For discussion of property rights in land, see Ellickson (1993, 1327 for discussion of ease of 
monitoring boundaries; 1362-3 for discussion of the bundle of property rights in land; 1381 for 
discussion of partitioning land across private and public uses.  
 
21 See Hannesson (2004). 
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The Costs of Measurement 
 Fluidity and in the case of groundwater, a lack of observability, also raise the costs of 
measuring a water right. For this reason, ownership is based on the amount diverted or pumped 
(Johnson, et al, 1981, 279). The amount actually diverted, however, varies over time due to 
fluctuating precipitation that affects stream flow, reservoir size, and groundwater recharge. 
Seasonal precipitation patterns generally are predictable and can be incorporated into a water 
claim, but long-term variation due to drought is less predictable, adding uncertainty to water 
supply and diversion amounts associated with a water right.   
 Mobile, unobserved fish stocks have comparable measurement problems. The stock is 
affected by natural growth (recruitment), disease, ocean temperature, food supplies, pollution, 
and harvest in ways that are often poorly understood. As a result, rights to fish or catch shares 
such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs), are based on the percent of the annual allowable 
catch, not to a fixed amount of fish.
22
 In contrast, there is no comparable problem for measuring 
fixed, observable land plots, where rights can be well defined with more certainty. 
The Interconnected Private and Public Goods Characteristics of Water 
 Because water diverters sequentially access the same (unconsumed) water and because 
there are associated amenity, riparian, and aquatic habitat values often simultaneously supplied, 
private and public water uses are intertwined to an extent not found for land or fish stocks 
(Smith, 2008; Hanemann, 2006). The interconnected nature of water uses and values is a basis 
for state regulation of water rights and water trades.  Although public goods or public interest 
claims have merit, these equity concepts can be so broad and elastic that they can be asserted in 
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 The New Zealand quota system began by assigning fixed amounts of fish, but was changed to 
a percentage of allowable catch. See Connor and Shallard (2010, 349). 
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the political and judicial processes by special interests to weaken property rights and the 
efficiency benefits they can provide for incentives for wise use, conservation, and exchange.     
Equity and Politics: Regulatory Constraints and Water Rights 
Beneficial Use, Diversion Requirements, Preferential Uses 
 Appropriative water rights are conditional upon placing the water into beneficial use--the 
use-it-or-lose-it mandate and no injury to third parties. Beneficial use was included in the 
appropriative doctrine as a low-cost way of determining if there was excess water to be assigned. 
Most western states define beneficial use generally as a use for the benefit of the appropriator, 
other persons, or the public with corresponding lists of what is considered beneficial use. 
Preferred applications vary somewhat across the states. Although, irrigation was the dominant 
initial basis for diversion, the set of beneficial uses can be expanded or contracted based on 
changing public values, judicial interpretations, and constituent group politics.  For example, 
leaving water in-stream for habit recently has been accepted as a beneficial use across the states 
although its exact definition differs among them (Getches, 1997, 113-4).
23
   
 The vague concept of beneficial use provides the basis for a potentially broad regulatory 
mandate (Getches, 1997, 128-9).  Because of this, the determination of beneficial use and 
diversion requirements consistent with it make water rights vulnerable to shifting legal and 
political interpretations, adding uncertainty to the water right.  Historically, physical diversion 
and complete use of diverted water was deemed consistent with the doctrine and maintenance of 
a water right.  But it has motivated irrigators to place water into low-valued applications, even 
though its use elsewhere might have higher values. Further, until recent changes in state law 
recognized conserved water as consistent with beneficial use, irrigators avoided conservation. 
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Any conserved water could be interpreted as evidence of a lack of beneficial use of the past 
allotment and therefore be subject to claiming by other diverters (Getches, 1997, 128).   
The "No Injury" Rule (Third Party Effects), Area of Origin Restrictions 
 Third party impairments are technical impacts resulting from the consecutive use of 
water. As noted above, changes in the timing, location, and nature of use can affect the amount 
and quality of water consumed or released to the stream for subsequent users or uses. In this 
event, junior rights holders especially could be harmed, and this is known as third-party 
impairment or a third-party effect. The prospect of third-party impairment has led western states 
to implement judicial or administrative procedures that must be followed before water use can be 
altered or water rights transferred. Although these procedures vary from state to state, they 
typically allow water use changes or water rights transfers only if there is no damage to other 
water rights holders, the "no injury rule" (Thompson 1993, 701;). Water transfers that are 
unlikely to have these impacts, such as trades among adjacent irrigators, typically do not require 
state approval because any third-party impairment is minimal.  
 As a result, most trades that could impact release flows must be approved by state 
regulatory agencies. Petitions for trade must specify the amount of water involved, the duration 
of the contract, the timing of the exchange, the type of water right, consumptive use, and 
possibly hydraulic and other legal information. The agency evaluates the proposal to determine 
whether third-party effects are involved. Notice of the proposed change is published so that 
objections to the change may be filed.  The burden of proof of no harm from the transfer usually 
rests with the applicant. The outcome of administrative review includes approval, approval 
19 
 
subject to modification, or denial, as well as provision of opportunities for appeal (Colby, 1995, 
114).
24
 
 Any objections by junior appropriators downstream or others may be resolved by 
adjustments in the amount of water, timing, or allowable uses in the exchange. Monetary 
payments or other forms of compensation also may be included.  The resolution of other third 
party complaints, however, may not be so straightforward. If substantial amounts of farm land 
are fallowed, there could be reduction in local demand for farm labor and in wholesale and retail 
trade within rural communities. Assessing the legitimacy, basis, and appropriate size of 
compensation to be paid for possible pecuniary impacts on farm labor and local merchants is 
complicated. There must be agreement on the damages, who should pay, and the terms and 
conditions of payment. All of these are likely to be controversial, and they potentially weaken 
water rights and reduce the gains from water reallocation.
25
   
 Additional third-party claims are apt to be even more difficult to assess. Rural politicians 
may find their political base eroded if large water transfers led to a decline in agricultural 
activities.  Other local officials, including school district administrators and county extension 
agents may be similarly affected.  Because these damages are hard to measure, monetary 
payments would be difficult to determine, and more importantly, under current law and political 
practices would be illegal. Accordingly, local politicians and bureaucratic officials may have an 
incentive to oppose water trades in their own self interest as well as in the interest of other 
constituencies who may be harmed.  
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  See also Colby, Bonnie G., Mark A. McGinnis, Ken Rait (1989) and Colby (1990). 
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 Despite these concerns, most studies suggest that third-party pecuniary effects will be 
small. Only limited amounts of water and fallowing are involved in most transactions. Water 
placed in low-valued uses is traded first, and as the amount of water involved increases, its 
marginal value rises.  As water prices increase, alternative urban and environmental users 
demand less. And there are monetary and efficiency benefits from the sale and more efficient use 
of water (Hanak, 2003 p. x-xii, 72; Howitt, 1994). Hanak (2003, 81) points out that effects of 
fallowing irrigated farmland are likely to have no more than a one percent effect on overall 
county economic activity, even when payments for economic adjustments are not included.  
 Third-party impairment can be a legitimate concern given the sequential uses of the same 
water by junior appropriative rights holders.  At the same time, how it affects water rights and 
water transfers depends upon how the problem is interpreted legally and the range for objections. 
If third-party impairment is strictly defined and limited to downstream, junior rights holders, 
who would feel a direct impact, then regulatory review is consistent with efficiency. If the 
problem is broadly defined to include multiple other constituencies and claims of harm, then 
inefficient rent-seeking becomes more probable, particularly given the high prices offered for 
water in some cases.    
 The regulatory process varies across the western states—in part reflecting the differential 
complexity of water supply and use and in part reflecting different supply and demand 
conditions. Two examples are provided to illustrate the process of regulation within the states.  
 California generally has pro-transfer legislation, but the regulatory and property rights 
environments are less supportive. These include mixed jurisdictions among state and federal 
agencies, a patchwork of county regulations of groundwater withdrawal and export, and a 
complex system of water rights with differential requirements for agency review (Gray 1994a, 
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178).  For example, only transfers of surface water rights acquired since 1914 require approval of 
the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB).  Exchanges within the huge Central Valley 
Project (CVP), where the Federal Bureau of Reclamation has jurisdiction, usually involving 
short-term agricultural water trades, do not involve the SWRCB (MacDonnell (1990, Vol. I, 17-
8, 24, Vol. II, Gray, 3-13).  Because there so many irrigation districts and supply organizations 
within the CVP with interlaced claims to water, any transfer by one entity to outside buyers is apt 
to affect another claimant,  triggering a regulatory review. The SWRCB also can deny a 
proposed water transfer if would “unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area from 
which the water is being transferred.”26 As a result, the administrative process of transferring 
water in California can be lengthy and complex, and the outcome uncertain.  
 Further, California counties are able to restrict extraction and export of groundwater out 
of county through area-of-origin restrictions. As of 2002, 22 of 58 counties had done so (Hanak, 
2003, vii; Gray, 1994a, 180; Hanak and Dyckman, 2003).  These county ordinances similarly can 
limit surface water transactions if they appear to diminish groundwater resources, either through 
lowered recharge or through greater farmer reliance upon pumping. Although there are 
legitimate groundwater issues at stake, recent research by Hanak (2003, viii) suggests that the 
overriding aim of the ordinances is to keep water within rural counties and limit reallocation to 
urban or environmental uses.  
 In Colorado there are different regulatory structures for the Northern Colorado 
Conservancy District that manages Colorado Big Thompson (CBT) water and for other parts of 
the state. In most of Colorado, water courts handle impairment claims for proposed water 
transactions. In the CBT, the courts do not have jurisdiction. Unlike more common appropriative 
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water rights, within the CBT each water right holder has the same priority and legal claim to a 
number of uniform water units that are tradable.  The amount of water in each unit fluctuates 
annually based on water supply. All shareholders are adjusted in the same manner. Return flows 
from any diversion are captured by the district so that all diversion effects are internalized 
district wide.  Because shares are homogenous, transfers across users, especially across sectors, 
occur with minimal fees and paperwork (Thompson, 1993, 719; Carey and Sunding, 2001, 305).  
In effect the Colorado Big Thompson has a cap-and-trade framework and has by far the most 
active water market in the West in terms of numbers of trades. Sales prices for all uses are 
comparable as they should be when opportunity costs are incorporated, water quality and right 
priority are the same, and transaction costs are low.
27
 
Public Resource, Public interest, Public Trust 
 For many, water is so critical and uses of it so complex, that there are calls for it to be a 
public resource (Bates, Wilkinson, MacDonnell, and Getches, 1993, 185): “A hard look at water 
policy should seek distributional fairness. . . . The public, through some acceptable process, must 
first decide which waters are for public use and which are available for private use within a 
market system. . . . [Private] appropriation ought to be limited to the amount that is not needed 
by the whole community for the satisfaction of public values.” Similarly, Dellapenna (2005, 35) 
argues that the best option is to “treat water as inherently public property for which basic 
allocation decisions must be made by public agencies.”  
                                                          
27 For example, sample agriculture-to-urban and agriculture-to-agriculture sales were priced at 
$9,350 and $9,300/unit respectively, as reported in the October 2008 Water Strategist, p. 7. The 
CBT also has the advantage of using water stored in a reservoirs, imported from elsewhere, 
providing a less complex case than when flowing streams are the water sources (Hansen and 
Howitt, 2005, 60).   
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 To the extent that these equity demands are based on the public goods nature of water, 
then they have to be weighed in the assignment and trade of private water rights.  Indeed, most 
western states require administrative agencies to consider the public interest in reviewing 
applications for new water rights (Bretson and Hill, 2009, 745). To the extent, instead, they are 
used primarily by certain parties to constrain existing property rights and water trades in their 
behalf, there can be important efficiency implications. The broader the interpretation of the 
public interest in water, the weaker the private interest in it and the ability of property rights to 
avoid open-access conditions, to channel the resource to higher valued uses through market 
exchange, and to encourage conservation and investment.
28
 
 As the public interest is expanded to include a more expansive array of uses and 
constituencies, many of which may be only loosely defined, more parties may assert a basis for 
disputing ownership and potential trades.  As regulatory-based transaction costs rise, water will 
flow less easily to higher valued uses, underscoring the persistent differences in water prices 
indicated in Table 1 and Figure 1 above.   
 It can be claimed legitimately that certain public goods values will not be reflected in 
market prices. Those claims require careful consideration and there are techniques, such as 
contingent valuation, for assessing non-market values.  Under those circumstances, water could 
be purchased by state agencies or non-government organizations for public good applications.  
This practice occurs, for example, in purchases or leases of water for in-stream flows by 
organizations such as the Oregon Water Trust (Neuman, 2004, Scarborough, 2010). The value of 
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 Public access conflicts are examples of the efficiency/equity trade-offs that exist in the West. 
In one case, at least, the water resource appears to have suffered from judicial rulings upholding 
the right to access. See http://missoulanews.bigskypress.com/missoula/the-battle-for-mitchell-
slough/Content?oid=1135390. 
 
24 
 
such transactions is that the opportunity cost of water becomes clearer. This information affects 
both the behavior of current water rights holders as sellers (often irrigators) and in-stream 
purchasers, so that more water is smoothly transferred without costly controversy to higher-
valued uses.      
 A broader public interest mandate also means that more allocative and management 
decisions necessarily will be directed to the state and the political process.  The record of state 
regulation of open-access fisheries, for example, is not one of success, and privatization of 
fisheries has resulted in significant rebounds of the stock (Costello, et al 2008).  Whether or not 
this same result would apply for water remains to be seen, but the call for a wide interpretation of 
the public interest and hence, greater state ownership and management should consider the 
conditions under which this institutional arrangement would be effective.   
 As part of this evaluation, more attention should be directed toward constituent group 
politics and the determinants of political and bureaucratic decision making in the process of 
effective water management (Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983).  In light of possible climate change 
and growing scarcity of water, the social losses of inefficient water management and allocation 
could be high.   
 A concept related to the public interest is the public trust doctrine, which is a common 
law principle creating the legal right of the public to utilize certain lands and waters, such as 
tidewaters or navigable rivers, and other waters and natural resources with high amenity or 
public goods values (Getches, 1997, 217, 224-8). Under the doctrine, the rights of the public are 
vested in the state as owner of the resource and trustee of its proper use. In a far-reaching ruling 
by the California Supreme Court in 1983 in the Mono Lake case (National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court 685 P.2d 709, 712) the court stated that the “core of the public trust doctrine is 
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the state‟s authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over” the 
waters of the state.” The doctrine can be applied retrospectively to roll back pre-existing 
appropriative rights that appear inconsistent with the public trust.  There apparently is no 
constitutional basis for taking challenges of public trust restrictions of private water rights 
(Simms, 1995, 321; Sax 1990, 264, 269).
29
  
 Because water is a mixed resource providing private and public goods, there can be 
justifiable concerns about private water use that potentially harm public values. The benefits of 
public trust interventions, however, have to be weighed carefully against the value of the private 
uses to be restricted or prohibited. The doctrine is so elastic and potentially expansive that it can 
lead to extensive government intrusion in water rights. The doctrine, then, potentially adds 
uncertainty to water ownership, weakening existing property rights and their ability to promote 
investment, trade, and efficient use of water.  
Equity, Politics, and Bureaucratic Incentives: The Parties Involved in Water Transactions 
 Although water rights holders and prospective purchasers or lessees are key parties in any 
exchange, other institutions play key decision-making roles in the timing and extent of water 
trades. Their actions affect the transaction costs of exchange and the development of water 
markets. The institutional complexity surrounding water rights and marketing far exceeds 
anything comparable for land and even perhaps for fisheries with their myriad mixes of fishers, 
processors, state, federal, and international management organizations. 
State Regulatory Agencies, Water Supply Organizations, Indian Tribes  
 We have already discussed the role of state regulatory agencies that must approve water 
transactions.  Additionally, there are approximately 1,127 water supply organizations across 17 
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 See also, Blumm and Schwartz (1995).  
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western states.
30
These institutions vary widely in terms of governance structure, membership, 
decision-making authority, and water rights. Many hold water rights in trust for their members, 
whereas in some others the rights are held by the users. The organizations range from irrigation 
districts, mutual ditch and reservoir companies, water conservancy districts, municipal water 
districts to water companies. This organizational complexity increases the number of decision 
rules and the transaction costs of defining clear property rights and of transferring water (Bretson 
and Hill, 2009).  
 For example, the governing boards of irrigation districts, the most common type of water 
supply institution, can be elected by members or by community voters. The voting rule can affect 
how the board responds to water transfer requests.  Districts where members elect the governing 
board appear to respond more quickly to changes in water values and water market opportunities 
than do districts where the governing board is elected community wide, where the interests are 
very heterogeneous and equity issues loom large.  
 The differential experiences of the Palo Verde (PVID) and Imperial Irrigation Districts 
(IID) in negotiations to sell or lease water are illustrative. The PVID Board is elected by 
members only whereas the IID Board is elected by community voters. In the case of publically-
elected boards, members may be much less interested in selling or leasing water under their 
jurisdiction than are land owners (Thompson, 1993, 678, 728, 740; Eden, et. al, 2008; and Rosen 
and Sexton, 1993). The PVID board reached agreement to fallow land and transfer water for 
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 Water User‟s Organization Roster, US Department of Interior. Bureau of Reclamation, as well 
as state agency sites; Leshy (1982). 
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urban use with little controversy, whereas the IID board was mired in lengthy, complex 
negotiations.
31
  
 In addition to irrigation districts, the Federal Bureau of Reclamation is often involved in 
any water exchange. The Federal Bureau of Reclamation is the largest wholesaler of water in the 
U.S. and it provides irrigation water for 140,000 farms covering 10,000 acres in 17 western 
states. It has over 600 dams and reservoirs to capture and divert water, historically, mostly for 
irrigation.
32
 The Bureau provides water to the irrigation districts through long-term service 
contracts. The Bureau can hold an appropriative right to the water within a reclamation project 
and the water is distributed anywhere within the project. The agency historically has had uneven 
policies toward water transfers (Thompson, 1993, 719-23).  It also can arbitrarily adjust water 
deliveries to farmers in response to competing demands, such as under the Endangered Species 
Act, without legal impairment to their perceived water rights. This weakens the security of any 
water rights that farmers thought they held, reducing their incentives for wise use and transfer 
(Bretsen and Hill, 2009, 741-2).
33
  
 The water held by Indian tribes potentially is a major source of water for marketing. 
Indian tribes have reserved water rights sufficient for the development of agriculture on their 
reservations. Their water rights date from when the reservation was established by treaty with the 
federal government, which was usually in the 19th century, and therefore generally supersede the 
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 Haddad (2000, 77, 95-116); Northwest Economic Associates (2004, 1-5); Hanak (2003, 72-3); 
Thompson (1993, 729, 757) and Glennon (2010, 258-71) discuss the Imperial Irrigation 
District‟s negotiations with San Diego and the MWD. 
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 As noted by Bretsen and Hill, 2009, 742, point out, in 1993 when the Bureau cut deliveries to 
the Westlands Water District by 50 %  to meet environmental needs, the Ninth Circuit Court 
ruled that the agency had not breached its contract with the district.  
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priority of non-Indian claimants. Many of these treaty provisions have only been recently 
enforced and Indian water rights adjudicated through litigation or congressional statute. As water 
prices have risen, tribes have begun to be active participants in water markets.  
 Many parties, then, are involved in water transactions. Their differential interests raise 
the transaction costs of water trades and potentially weaken water rights.  
Concluding Remarks: Water Rights, Water Markets, Efficiency and Equity Concerns. 
 This chapter has outlined the complex nature of water as a mixed private/public resource, 
and how that characteristic, as well as its physical qualities complicate its management and 
allocation. Although the focus here has been on the U.S. West, similar conditions exist in other 
semi-arid regions where increased fresh water scarcity is raising pressures for more efficient 
water use and management as well as greater equity demands.   
 Efficiency and equity demands often collide in a manner that inhibits action and sustains 
the status quo. This situation, however, is not sustainable as demands on a limited water resource 
grow. There is both a greater need to facilitate the smooth reallocation of water from historical to 
new uses and to improve management of this most critical resource, as well as to provide for 
more environmental, amenity, and recreational uses. Firmer water rights and greater reliance 
upon water markets can address efficiency concerns, and equity issues can be addressed in the 
allocation of water rights and in the regulatory process.  But the latter cannot go too far if the 
efficiency advantages of secure rights and markets are to be available for this all-important 
resource. There are efficiency/equity trade-offs, and policies toward water must reflect this 
recognition. 
  Critics of appropriative water rights and water markets are explicit in outlining market 
failure. There is not, however, a similar level of precision in defining how the 
29 
 
political/judicial/administrative processes will function to effectively manage and distribute 
water, let alone address equity concerns, to meet growing challenges regarding the resource. Yet, 
these issues must be addressed before greater authority over water is shifted to the state as part of 
a public interest mandate.  Comparative institutional analysis is necessary to determine how 
much decision making over water will be left optimally to private rights and (regulated) markets 
and how much will be delegated to the political, judicial, and administrative processes. Water 
demands no less.  
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Table 1: Water Transfer Prices by Sector 1987-2008 (2008 dollars per committed acre foot)
 
 
 Agriculture-to-
Urban Leases 
Agriculture-to-
Agriculture 
Leases 
Agriculture-to-
Urban Sales 
Agriculture-to-
Agriculture Sales 
Median Price $74 $19 $295 $144 
Mean Price $190 $56 $437 $246 
Number of Observations 204 207 1,140 215 
Source: Author‟s calculations from dataset  http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm 
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Table 2: Surface Water Use (2005) and Average Water Trading Volume, Western US 1987-2008 
 
Surface Water Use (2005) 
Current Total Water Transferred per Year 
(Committed)
*
 
 
State Total (AF)
**
 Irrigation (AF) 
Average 
Volume (AF)
***
 
As % of Total 
Use 
As % of 
Irrigation 
Use 
Median Price 
Difference 
(Agriculture 
-to-Urban 
minus 
Agriculture -
to-
Agriculture) 
AZ 3,154,970 2,540,000 1,056,749 33.5% 41.6% $17 
CA 22,087,390 15,700,000 1,939,336 8.8% 12.4% $30 
CO 10,984,830 10,000,000 779,478 7.1% 7.8% $232 
ID 15,169,140 12,700,000 491,005 3.2% 3.9% N.A. 
MT 9,736,660 9,530,000 28,698 0.3% 0.3% $45 
NV 1,374,870 828,000 118,677 8.6% 14.3% $175 
NM 1,611,860 1,550,000 221,979 13.8% 14.3% $54 
OR 5,077,910 3,780,000 442,625 8.7% 11.7% $10 
TX 6,695,160 1,680,000 1,735,658 25.9% 103.3% $15 
UT 4,117,390 3,610,000 228,932 5.6% 6.3% $22 
WA 3,765,180 2,890,000 183,402 4.9% 6.3% $25 
WY 3,663,120 3,570,000 48,835 1.3% 1.4% $77 
Total 87,438,480 68,378,000 7,275,374 8.3% 10.6%  
Sources and notes: *Using committed amounts as calculated by the author from the dataset 
http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm makes sense because it reflects the full amount of 
water obligated under the contract. Using the annual flow of the first year of the contract would understate 
the amount of water involved. See Brewer et al (2008). 
** Kenny, et al (2009) provide estimates of the total and irrigated use of water in the U.S. by state and the 
Bren dataset allows for trading estimates by author. Excluding water used for thermoelectric cooling.  
This category includes surface water use for public consumption, agriculture (irrigation, livestock, and 
aquaculture), industry, and mining. 
*** Average volume is the sum of all committed flows transferred in each year, averaged over the 22-
year period recorded in the dataset.  Because transactions often are for multiple years, the data here are 
calculated by the author to reflect longer time horizons. Although we might say 10,000 AF was 
transferred in 2008, we really mean the discounted sum of committed flows for the duration of the 
transaction is 10,000 AF in 2008—some of the flows are actually transferred in later years.  This allows 
for a consistent treatment of prices. 
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Table 3: Potential Gains from Increased Ag-to-Urban Transactions* 
State 
Current 
Average 
Annual 
Market Value 
(All Transfer 
Types and 
Sectors) 
**
 
Proposed 
new 
Agriculture
-to-Urban 
Transfers 
(AF)
***
 
Net Welfare Gain 
from Additional 
Transactions
****
 
Net 
Welfare 
Gain as 
% of 
Current 
Market 
Value 
Proposed 
Agricultur
e -to-
Urban 
Transfers 
(AF)***** 
Net Welfare 
Gain 
Net Welfare 
Gain as % 
of Current 
Market 
Value 
AZ $38,811,748 25,400 $440,362 1% 76,200  $1,321,087  3% 
CA $223,477,457 71,126 $2,135,504 1% 471,000  $14,141,453  6% 
CO $40,819,066 31,084 $7,224,465 18% 300,000  $69,725,433  171% 
ID $5,194,129 N.A. N.A. N.A. 40,710  $0    
MT $294,998 1,186 $53,692 18% 11,858  $536,920  182% 
NV $4,191,448 2,185 $382,668 9% 21,854  $3,826,683  91% 
NM $36,334,302 14,570 $782,415 2% 46,500  $2,497,023  7% 
OR $10,014,045 151 $1,456 0% 1,509  $14,562  0% 
TX $39,093,722 16,800 $251,868 1% 50,400  $755,604  2% 
UT $6,328,674 17,820 $388,094 6% 108,300  $2,358,663  37% 
WA $1,097,697 9,016 $225,025 20% 86,700  $2,163,814  197% 
WY $267,649 772 $59,365 22% 7,721  $593,651  222% 
Total $405,924,936 190,110 $11,944,915 3% 1,222,753  $97,934,893  24% 
Sources and notes:
*
 Author‟s calculations. Differences that occur are the result of rounding. 
**
This is the sum of the total price of every transaction from 1987-2008 in 2008 dollars divided by 22 
years to arrive at a yearly average. 
***
1% of surface irrigation water in AZ and TX, and 10% of current agriculture to urban market for CA, 
CO, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY. 
****
 Net welfare gain is price difference (Ag-to-Urban minus Ag-to-Ag) multiplied by volume of 
additional transfers. 
***** 
Transfer Minimum of 3% Irrigation Volume, or 100% Current Urban Market Volume, whichever 
was smaller. The large welfare gain as shown in Colorado likely reflects the difference in high prices paid 
for water within the Colorado-Big Thompson District discussed in the text.  
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Table 4: Share of each Transfer's Classification to a State's Total Quantity Transferred 
  
  
Annual Flow 
  
  
Committed 
  
        Total       Total 
  
Agriculture-
to-Urban 
Agriculture-
to-
Agriculture 
Urban-
to-
Urban  (Million AF) 
Agriculture-
to-Urban 
Agriculture-
to-
Agriculture 
Urban-
to-
Urban 
(Million 
AF) 
AZ 15% 46% 39% 8.34 31% 37% 32% 21.72 
CA 41% 32% 27% 5.04 37% 32% 31% 12.60 
CO 51% 29% 20% 0.59 75% 8% 17% 5.88 
ID 39% 55% 6% 1.59 29% 67% 5% 2.36 
MT 55% 45% 0% 0.02 95% 5% 0% 0.22 
NM 15% 78% 7% 0.10 36% 55% 10% 0.91 
NV 84% 0% 16% 0.22 72% 0% 28% 2.39 
OR 0% 100% 0% 0.10 0% 100% 0% 0.29 
TX 48% 15% 37% 1.75 50% 3% 47% 25.30 
UT 38% 32% 29% 0.31 53% 3% 44% 4.05 
WA 49% 36% 15% 0.16 79% 3% 18% 1.93 
WY 37% 63% 0% 0.10 38% 62% 0% 0.41 
Source: Author‟s calculations from dataset http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm. 
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Table 5: Resource Characteristics  
Resource Ability to Bound, 
Partition, 
Exclude  
Measure Size 
Amount 
Variability of 
Supply 
Simultaneous 
Uses  
Sequential 
Uses 
Land + + + + + 
Fish 
Stocks 
- - - - - 
Water  - - - - - 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 1: Prices Over Time 
 
 
 Source: Author‟s calculations from dataset http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm  
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Figure 2 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations from dataset http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm.  
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